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Abstract
The new dynamical game theoretic model of sex ratio evolution emphasizes the role of males as passive carriers of sex ratio
genes. This shows inconsistency between population genetic models of sex ratio evolution and classical strategic models. In
this work a novel technique of change of coordinates will be applied to the new model. This will reveal new aspects of the
modelled phenomenon which cannot be shown or proven in the original formulation. The underlying goal is to describe
the dynamics of selection of particular genes in the entire population, instead of in the same sex subpopulation, as in the
previous paper and earlier population genetics approaches. This allows for analytical derivation of the unbiased strategic
model from the model with rigorous non-simplified genetics. In effect, an alternative system of replicator equations is
derived. It contains two subsystems: the first describes changes in gene frequencies (this is an alternative unbiased
formalization of the Fisher-Dusing argument), whereas the second describes changes in the sex ratios in subpopulations of
carriers of genes for each strategy. An intriguing analytical result of this work is that the fitness of a gene depends on the
current sex ratio in the subpopulation of its carriers, not on the encoded individual strategy. Thus, the argument of the gene
fitness function is not constant but is determined by the trajectory of the sex ratio among carriers of that gene. This aspect
of the modelled phenomenon cannot be revealed by the static analysis. Dynamics of the sex ratio among gene carriers is
driven by a dynamic ‘‘tug of war’’ between female carriers expressing the encoded strategic trait value and random partners
of male carriers expressing the average population strategy (a primary sex ratio). This mechanism can be called ‘‘double-level
selection’’. Therefore, gene interest perspective leads to multi-level selection.
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Introduction
Sex ratio evolution is one of the basic examples of evolutionary
mechanisms that are presented in every course on evolutionary
biology. The first approach to this problem was presented by
German biologist Carl Dusing [2]. Historically, it was the first
application of mathematical modeling to evolutionary phenome-
na. Dusing argued that the fitness of females using different sex
ratio strategies can be described by the number of their
grandoffspring. A similar approach was applied by Fisher and
Shaw and Mohler [3,4,5]. This is also an important example in
evolutionary game theory, known as a sex ratio game [6,7,8,9,10,11].
The general prediction of this approach is that the sex ratio of 0.5
is evolutionarily stable. However, there is an alternative approach
to the modeling of sex ratio evolution related to population
genetics [5,12,13,14]. This approach is focused on tracing the
genes encoding sex ratio strategies. Those models predict a stable
structure of the population describing gene frequencies among
males and females and a sex ratio as the effect of expression of
those genes. Therefore, there is a major difference between the
strategic phenotypic approach and genetic modeling [15,16,17].
The phenotypic approach describes the mean female strategy of
0.5 as evolutionarily stable, while genetic models show that the
composition of the male population can also matter. To analyze
this problem, in our previous paper [1], a new model of sex ratio
evolution was developed. The new approach is an attempt to
combine the genetic and phenotypic approach and to overcome
the limitations of both of them. The goal was to solve the problem
of different predictions and to obtain a coherent picture of the
modeled phenomenon.
The new model focuses on the global dynamics of the system,
and its structure resembles the genetic approach [5,12,13,14].
Whereas the classical Dusing-Fisher-Shaw-Mohler (DFSM) model
is focused on the reproductive success of individual strategies
carried by female strategic agents (as in Dusing’s paper, see [2], or
the sex ratio game) or some undescribed group of ‘‘parents’’ (as in
[3,4], more on this topic in section 4.2). For a closer understanding
of the relations between the classical and the new approach, the
selection of individual strategies resulting from global dynamics
must be analyzed, which is the subject of this paper.
In this paper a novel technique of change of coordinates will be
applied to the model from [1]. This will reveal new aspects of the
modelled phenomenon which cannot be shown or proven in the
original formulation. Similarly the results from [1] will be hard to
show in the new coordinates, thus the two papers complement
each other. The underlying goal is to describe the dynamics of
selection of particular genes in the entire population, instead of in
the same sex subpopulation as in the previous paper and earlier
population genetics approaches. In effect, an unbiased strategic
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model will be analytically derived from the non-simplified rigorous
genetic model.
Thus, the classical strategic approach analyzes the reproductive
success of a female, while the genetic approach traces gene
frequencies in the population. Therefore, what happens when we
combine both perspectives and assume that the gene is the
strategic agent?
Methods
Now we shall recall the structure of the new model (see Table 1
for the list of symbols). Section 1 can be skipped by readers
familiar with paper [1].
1.1 Summary of basic formal details of the new model
There are u individual strategies described by Pi[½0,1, the
proportion of male offspring of a female playing strategy Pi. There
are xi females and yi male carriers of the strategy Pi in the
population. Therefore, the population consists of x~Sixi females
and y~Siyi males. Thus, f ~½f1,:::, fu is the vector of frequencies
of strategies of the female subpopulation, and m~½m1,:::, mu is an










is the fraction of males in the population (the
secondary sex ratio), and Sj fjPj is the mean female strategy (the
primary sex ratio). Assume that each female produces k offspring
according to haploid inheritance. However, males are gene
carriers too, and transfer those genes to their offspring with the
probability 0.5. The influence of males can be described by the
fitness exchange effect (i.e. daughters of male carriers contribute to the
fitness of female carriers and sons of female carriers contribute to




is the expected number of male offspring,
and Wmf ~0:5 Sj fj 1{Pj
   xk
y
is the expected number of
female offspring of the male individual. Analogously,
Wfm~0:5(1{Pi)k is the expected number of male offspring,
and Wff ~0:5Pik is the expected number of female offspring of
Table 1. List of important symbols:
classical theory:
P – secondary sex ratio
Pind – individual strategy interpreted as the mean sex ratio in the brood of a single female, which is the carrier of this strategy ( P with index denotes the individual
strategy)
N- population size
k – mean brood size of a single female
Wf P, f , mð Þ~
i
fiWf Pi , P, f , mð Þ – mean fitness function of the female subpopulation
W P, f , mð Þ~P Wm(P, f , m)z(1{P) Wf P, f , mð Þ – mean fitness function of the whole population
W (Pind , P) – classical Dusing-Fisher-Shaw-Mohler fitness function
new model:
y – number of males
x – number of females
N~yzx – population size








frequency of males with strategy Pi
f ~½f1,:::, fu -state vector of the female subpopulation
m~½m1,:::, mu -state vector of the male subpopulation
G~½G1,:::, Gu – state vector of the gene pool















– number of females per single male individual
Ppr~
j
fjPj -primary sex ratio (mean strategy in the female subpopulation)
Wm(Pi , P, f , m) – males’ payoff function
Wf Pi , P, f , mð Þ – females’ payoff function
Wg(Pi , G, M)- fitness function of a gene which encodes strategy Pi
Wm(P, f , m)~
i
miWm(Pi , P, f , m) – mean fitness function of the male subpopulation
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060405.t001
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the female individual playing the strategy Pi: Therefore, the
following equations were obtained:












– payoff function of the males carrying the strategy Pi,














– payoff function of the females playing the strategy Pi:
Now we have all elements needed to formulate multipopulation
replicator dynamics (see appendix A in the File S1). In [1], this
took the following form:
_fi~fi Wf (Pi, P, f , m){ Wf P, f , mð Þ
 
for i~(1,:::, u{1),
_mi~mi Wm(Pi, P, f , m){ Wm P, f , mð Þð Þ for i~(1,:::, u{1),
_P~P Wm(P, f , m){ W P, f , mð Þð Þ,
where Wm(P, f , m)~SjmiWm(Pi, P, f , m), Wf P, f , mð Þ~
i
fiWf
Pi, P, f , mð Þ, W P, f , mð Þ~P Wm(P, f , m)z(1{P) Wf P, f , mð Þ
are the respective average payoff functions of the male, female and

























It was shown that, for biological reasons, we can limit the
analysis of the model to values of primary and secondary sex ratios
over the interval(0, 1):
1.2 Summary of predictions of the new model
An analysis of the behavior of this model shows that two phases
of convergence can be distinguished. The first, rapid phase occurs
when the secondary sex ratio P converges to the current value of
the primary sex ratioSj fjPj , and the male subpopulation
converges to the state termed the male subpopulation equilibrium
(MSE), described by the condition fiPi~miSj fjPj : During the
second phase of convergence, the primary sex ratio converges to
the value 0.5, and the value of the secondary sex ratio follows these
changes to maintain equality. In addition, the state of the male
subpopulation changes to maintain the MSE.
Results
2. Reformulation of the model
In the previous paper [1], a change in the coordinates (described
in appendix A in the File S1) was applied to the numerical
solutions obtained to calculate the frequencies of all types of
individuals (see Fig. 3c in [1] and section 3.2 there) and gene
frequencies (see Fig. 6 in [1] and section 4 there). However, this
method can be applied not only to numerical solutions, but also
directly to replicator equations. In this way, we can reformulate
the new model to focus on changes in gene frequencies. We have
Pmi male carriers and 1{Pð Þ fi female carriers of a strategy Pi in
the whole population. Thus, the frequency of carriers of a gene
which encodes this strategy is equal to:
Gi~Pmiz 1{Pð Þ fi: ð3Þ
The state of the population can be described by the
vectorG~½G1,:::, Gu[Du, whereSjGj~1: In this description,
there is no information about the sex of the carriers of these
genes. We can fill this gap by adding information about the sex















-proportion of females among carriers of Pi:
Then, M~½M1,:::, Mu is the vector of subpopulation sex
ratios. Therefore, this structure can be treated as a division of the
entire population into u subgroups with one-dimensional subpop-
ulation states. Then, according to the general notation from
appendix A in the File S1, si~Mi and cj~Gj (see also [18]), the
structure of the space of population states will take the form
presented in Fig. 1. Note that in the previous formulation of the
model, the space of population states was the product of two u{1
dimensional simplexes of the male and female subpopulation and a
one-dimensional simplex of the proportion between these
subpopulations (a secondary sex ratio); in general, the dimension
of the whole space was 2u{1: In the new formulation, this space
Figure 1. Scheme of a space of population states in the new
formulation of the model. In this case, it is a product of a simplex of
gene frequencies and u one-dimensional simplexes that describe sex
ratios in the subpopulations of carriers for each strategy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060405.g001
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consists of one u{1 dimensional simplex of gene frequencies and
u one-dimensional simplexes of subpopulation sex ratios, and the
dimension of the whole space of population states is also 2u{1:
Therefore, the dimension of the space of population states is
invariant in response to the change of coordinates, which is
consistent with the fact that we have a different parameterization
of the same phase space. We can describe important population
parameters in the new coordinates for parameters such as the
mean female subpopulation strategy Ppr, i.e., the primary sex ratio




Sj(1{Mj)GjPj and P~SjGjMj :
The average fitness functions from the previous paper (recalled
in section 1.1) were:




– mean fitness of the male subpopulation,
Wf P, f , mð Þ~k 1{Sj fiPi
 
– mean fitness of the female subpopulation,
Figure 2. Trajectories of a population of individuals with strategies for sex ratios of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 for initial conditions.







and PwMi and decreases when Pv
1
2
and PwMi or Pw
1
2
and PvMi . This mechanism is clearly shown in the trajectories of
strategy 0.5. The trajectory G0:5 switches from a decrease to an increase when trajectory of M0:5 passes the trajectory of P (see panel b). Panel b)
shows the respective changes of sex ratios in carrier subpopulations Mi: Note that sex ratios in carrier subpopulations rapidly converge to the values
determined by the MSE phenomenon, and after that, they follow the changes of the primary sex ratio Ppr that slowly converges to 0.5. The sex ratio
among carriers of male biased strategies change due to the dynamics of the primary sex ratio while among female biased strategies, it converges to
the neighbourhood of the value encoded by the gene.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060405.g002
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W P, f , mð Þ~k(1{P)
– mean fitness of the whole population.
Then, we can derive the mean payoff to the carrier of a gene for
strategy Pi (for a full derivation see appendix B in the File S1):
Wg(Pi, P,f , m)~Wg(Pi, G, M)~MiWm(Pi, P,f , m)
z(1{Mi)Wf (Pi, P,f , m),
















is the number of females per single male
individual. For the new coordinates we obtain the following
replicator equations (for a detailed derivation, see appendix C in
the File S1):
_Gi~Gi Wg(Pi, P,f , m){ W (P,f , m)
 
-dynamics of gene frequencies,
_Mi~Mi Wm(Pi, P,f , m){Wg(Pi, P,f , m)
 

























3. Behavior of trajectories of replicator equations
3.1 Trajectories of gene frequencies. Here, we will









is responsible for the sign of the right side
of equation (6). When both coefficients are negative or positive,
then their product is positive (the frequency of gene Pi increases),
and when they have opposite signs, then their product will be




and P~Mi, are stationary points of
equation (6). Therefore, the dynamics of the gene frequencies can





















Recall that P~SjGjMj , which means that the secondary sex
ratio is equal to the average sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation
over the entire population. Therefore, the frequency Gi decreases
when the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation Mi is shifted
farther from 0.5 than the mean sex ratio in the carrier
subpopulations for all strategies P: In the opposite case, Gi will
increase. This mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 2a. Therefore, the
frequency of a gene that encodes the strategy 0.5 increases when
the sex ratio in a subpopulation of its carriers is closer to 0.5 than
the current value of the secondary sex ratio; this frequency
decreases in the opposite case. A situation in which the secondary
sex ratio is equal to 0.5 is the stationary state of the dynamics of
gene frequencies (6). Therefore, this mechanism described by (8) is
independent of individual strategies Pi, but its dynamics are
dependent on the trajectories of the sex ratios in the subpopula-
tions of carriers of the strategies described by Mi. Note that
parameter Mi also affects the secondary sex ratioP~SjGjMj ,
modifying the values of Gj : However, sex ratios in carrier
subpopulations Mj are determined by mechanisms acting at the
level of carrier subpopulations that are described in the next
section.
3.2 Trajectories of sex ratios in subpopulations of
carriers. The dynamics of sex ratios in the carrier subpopula-
tions are more sophisticated. The right side of equation (7)
contains two coefficients: Ppr{Mi
 
and Pi{Mið Þ, weighted by
current values of MiC and 1{Mið Þ: These coefficients are
responsible for the direction of convergence. The coefficient
Ppr{Mi
 
induces attraction of Mi to Ppr, and the coefficient
Pi{Mið Þ causes attraction of Mi to Pi: This is, in a sense, a tug of
war between female partners of the male carriers (representing
average strategy Ppr) and female carriers of the same gene
(representing encoded strategy Pi). As we can see in Fig. 2b, the
shape of the trajectory of a 0.8 sex ratio strategy that produces
mostly sons is almost parallel to the trajectory of parameter P,
which is equal to Ppr in the slow phase of convergence (see [1]).
On the other hand, the trajectory of a 0.2 sex ratio strategy that
produces more daughters is closer to the constant function 0.2
than to the trajectory of P: Thus, the Mi value of the strategies
producing (and in effect carried by) mostly males resemble
trajectories of the primary sex ratio, while female biased strategies
have Mi almost constant and equal to Pi. This interesting aspect
would be hard to show by static analysis. Below, we will
characterize equilibrium in this ‘‘tug of war’’.
Lemma 1
a) For every set of values of P, Ppr[(0, 1) and Pi[(0,1,
dynamics (7) has the unique stable conditional equilibrium
Mi that is contained in the interval limited by the values of
Ppr and Pi:
b) For the strategy Pi~0, there is one stationary point, Mi~0,
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, the rest point Mi~0 becomes unstable, and there




For a proof, see Appendix D in the File S1.
Lemma 1 indicates that, at every moment, there exists some
attracting point for Mi lying between the current value of the
primary sex ratio Ppr (which also changes in time) and the value of
individual strategy Pi. By this dynamic equilibrium, the expression
of individual strategies determines the parameter Mi. The only
exception is strategy Pi~0 (production of female offspring only)
for which the second stationary state may exist during the rapid
phase of convergence. It was impossible to analytically derive the
stable sex ratio in the carrier subpopulations, in the general case.
This is possible only when the population is in the MSE state and
will be presented in a subsequent paper devoted to the MSE.
According to Lemma 1, we can numerically approximate this
value because it is unique in these biologically significant cases.
Discussion
4.1 The mechanism of ‘‘double-level’’ selection
Here, we will summarize the results we have obtained. The first
intriguing analytical result of the reformulated model is that the
fitness function of a gene (5) is independent of the individual
strategy it encodes. Proliferation of a given gene depends on the
current sex ratio in the subpopulation of its carriers Mi: Note that
the fitness function (5) is a good mathematical description of
Fisher’s idea, which is related to the reproductive value of carriers
with different sexes according to the deviation of the secondary sex
ratio P. It suggests that males are reproductively more efficient
when they are in the minority (P,1/2), because each male can
mate with several females (C.1). On the other hand, females are
more efficient when they are in the minority (P.1/2), because
each female will be expected to produce offspring, and there are
not enough mates for all males (C,1). Therefore, parameter Mi
describes the proportion of carriers with the more reproductively
efficient sex among all carriers of a gene. This fitness function
explicitly considers male carriers from the mother’s generation of
unexpressed sex ratio genes. Function (5) can be transformed in
the following way (recall that yi is the number of male carriers, and

























This is the per capita normalized sum (averaged over the
carriers subpopulation) of the offspring produced by female










is the number of
offspring of a single female multiplied by the probability of gene
transfer from the focal parent). This is an explanation of the
importance of male carriers of the unexpressed sex ratio genes, or
rather their female partners. Their role is important, because each
male carrier may have C partners, and the activity of their
partners is an important component of gene fitness. Surprisingly,
this function is independent of the value of a given strategy, Pi,
encoded by the carried gene. It depends only on C and Mi: The
phenomenon can be termed double level selection. The fitness of a
gene that encodes an individual strategy is determined in some
way by the current sex ratio in its carrier subpopulation and the
secondary sex ratio in the population as a whole. Values of both
parameters may be perturbed. However, the stable carrier
subpopulation sex ratio should be determined in some way by
the value of the encoded strategy (Fig. 3). This is a newly
discovered mechanism. In general, the mechanism of double level
selection can be regarded as an example of multi-level selection,
which is the concept presented by [19,20,21,22,23]. The classical
approach to the modeling of sex ratio evolution treats this
phenomenon as single level selection, which means that the fitness is
unambiguously determined by the values of individual strategy Pi
and a population state described by the secondary sex ratio (Fig. 3).
In the next subsection, a higher level of this process will be
considered.
4.2 Dynamics of gene frequencies
The mechanism realized by gene frequency replicator equations
(6), described by the rules (8) increases the frequency of a gene for
Figure 3. A comparison of ‘‘single level’’ selection and ‘‘double level’’ selection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060405.g003
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which the value of a parameter Mi is greater/smaller than the
secondary sex ratio P (which is equal to the average M in the
population) when P is smaller/greater than 0.5. Thus, it is
profitable for the gene to be carried by that sex which is currently
in the minority. There is an interesting relationship between the
mechanism described by (8) and the replicator dynamics
paradigm. In standard replicator equations, frequencies of
strategies change according to the sign of the deviation of their
fitness from average fitness (minus – decrease, plus – increase). If
fitness depends linearly on a particular trait, then selection works
according to deviations from the average trait value. Note that the
payoff function (5) is linear with respect to the parameter (trait) Mi,
and the secondary sex ratio P is an average Mi over the population.
The difference between the mechanism in rules (8) and standard
replicator dynamics is that parameter Mi is not a description of a
fixed individual strategy but of the current state of a subgroup of
individuals (the subpopulation of carriers of strategy Pi). Dusing
classically argued that female producing offspring of the sex that is
currently in the minority will have more grand-offspring. This
argument states that there are differences in fitness among females
with different strategies, which is considered a proof of the
existence of selection on individual strategies. However, our new
model shows that a mechanism based on different reproductive
values is independent of individual strategies Pi, and it affects the
primary sex ratio Ppr and the secondary sex ratio P (which is equal
to the average sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation) by changing
only gene frequencies Gj : In [3], the following statement can be
found:
‘‘...it would follow that those parents, the innate tendencies of which
caused them to produce males in excess, would for the same expenditure,
produce a greater amount of reproductive value; and in consequence
would be the progenitors of a larger fraction of future generations…’’.
Therefore, Fisher in his original reasoning considered a group of
individuals that adjusts the sex ratio among its members due to
genetic mechanisms. However, the mechanisms for this adjust-
ment were not explicitly explained. The perspective of a group
adjusting the sex ratio among its members is also assumed by [4].
However, they also presented only a conjecture that the sex ratio is
completely heritable within the group, without an explanation of
how it is realized. Therefore, there is a difference between Fisher’s
reasoning that operated on the level of the subpopulation of all
carriers of a gene and Dusing’s approach related to the level of
female individuals. The female perspective is not sufficient,
especially for male-biased strategies, which will produce more
male than female carriers. This means that the Fisherian argument
about the different reproductive values of males and females is an
important part of understanding sex ratio self-regulation. Howev-
er, it is not enough for a full mechanistic explanation of this
process. Therefore, we should investigate how the expression of
individual strategies determines the sex ratio in the carrier
subpopulation Mi: This will allow us to overcome the limitations
of Dusing’s reasoning, which considers only female reproductive
success and disregards the role of male gene carriers from the same
generation.
4.3 Dynamics of sex ratios in carrier subpopulations: the
‘‘tug of war’’ mechanism
The sex ratio in carrier subpopulations is the effect of intrinsic
dynamics that can be compared to a ‘‘tug of war’’ between Pi and
Ppr: It was proved in Lemma 1 that for every population state
there exists a single unique attractor of Mi dynamics contained in
the interval that is limited by values of Ppr and Pi: Let us describe
the ‘‘tug of war’’ metaphor in a more formal way. The right-hand


















and the proportion (1{Mi) that is the weight
of Pi{Mið Þ equals
xi
xizyi









Since C is the number of females per single male, then yiC is
also the number of female partners of male carriers of gene
encoding the strategyPi: These females ‘‘pull the rope’’ toward the
value of Ppr: On the other side, a team of xi female carriers of this
gene ‘‘pulls the rope’’ toward the value Pi: It is evident here that
the expression of strategies of parental individuals determines the
fate of their descendants, by the setting of the sex ratio among
them.
4.4 An unresolved problem: the role of the male
subpopulation equilibrium
Recall that, during the slow phase of the sex ratio dynamics,
Ppr~P: Note that, if in rules (8) we substitute Ppr instead of P and
fi instead of Mi we obtain the following rules:
fi increases when Sj fjPjv
1
2












fi is stable when: fi~0 or fi~1 or Pi~Sj fjPj :
These describe the changes of a female subpopulation state
when the MSE condition is satisfied (Lemma 1 from [1]). This
leads to the problem of the role of the MSE phenomenon, which is
responsible for the rapid phase of convergence and the dynamics
of sex ratios in the carrier subpopulations. The first idea that
comes to mind to explain this phenomenon is that the male
subpopulation equilibrium is equivalent to some stable sex ratio in
the carrier subpopulation (the equilibrium of the ‘‘tug of war’’
mechanism), which is conditional on current values of P, Ppr and
Pi: The rapid phase will then be equivalent to convergence to this
stable value. When the subpopulation reaches a stable sex ratio,
then it simply follows changes of the primary (and in effect the
secondary) sex ratio, which are equivalent to the slow phase of
convergence. Unfortunately, this idea is false. As shown in [1],
when the MSE conditions are satisfied for all strategies, then all
males in the population have the same fitness. If we assume that
carrier subpopulations are in their stable states, then for all
strategies females will have fitness equal to males. So, when all
males have equal fitness, and all females have fitness equal to
males, then all individuals in the population have equal fitness. In
this case, the population would be in a global stationary state,
which is not true. The nature and role of the male subpopulation
equilibrium are the subjects of a subsequent paper.
The Dynamics of Sex Ratio Evolution II
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